Abstract: Social environments were already present in the original Web vision, but nowadays are mainly available through Online Social Networks (OSNs), which are a real cultural phenomenon. However, their actual deployment is very heterogeneous, reflecting into different development choices and functional architectures. Such aspects, jointly with the intrinsic sharing of personal information, lead to severe risks both in terms of security and privacy.
Introduction
Nowadays, enabling social interactions among individuals is a critical requirement for many network applications. In fact, boosted by the availability of ubiquitous connectivity, the Internet is even more an Internet of People (IoP), rather than a simple internetwork of hosts (Zhang et al., 2011) . This paradigm has also accounted for the huge success of Web 2.0, which enables to create and share contents with an increased degree of social connectivity.
Although, such features were already present in the original Web vision. Specifically, the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) put effort in the definition of a Social Web, where, "people can create networks of relationships overlapped with the entire Web, while controlling their own privacy and data" (Social Web Incubator Group, 2005) . Unfortunately, social applications are not based on standardized architectures. Rather, they delegate adhoc services, that are becoming real cultural phenomena.
Online Social Networks (OSNs) are the archetype of this new wave of applications accounting for millions of active users worldwide (see, e.g., Caviglione & Coccoli (2011) and references therein). Even if there are no standard definitions, an informal one can be as follows: an OSN enables the interaction among participants according to some relationship basis. The rules defining connections can be very mixed. For instance, they can be based on friendship, business partnership, or common interests.
As a consequence, OSNs are highly specialized, e.g., there are general-purpose services for dealing with specific topics, such as books and traveling. To make some examples of the broad nature of OSNs, we mention Facebook, Google+ and Twitter. Facebook and Google+ offer a rich set of functionalities, ranging from text and multimedia sharing, to AV communications. Instead, Twitter only allows posting short text messages (accordingly called "tweets" having, at least in their basic form, a maximum of 140 characters).
To summarize, even if the "space of features" offered by OSNs is very split, their popularity is mainly given by the following core characteristics: i ) they allow to share user-generated contents in a quick and simple way (e.g., there is no need for additional hosting or authoring tools); ii ) they support user-touser real-time communications, as well as asynchronous conversations through messages and comments; iii ) many OSNs are appealing development environments since they provide a set of Applications Programming Interfaces (APIs) to create new services or to extend their basic functionalities (Esfahani & Malek, 2010) ; iv ) earlier incarnations of OSNs were "closed" (i.e., a user belonging to a service could not interact with similar platforms operated by different providers), but nowadays proper data percolation can be made through specific interfaces (Caviglione & Coccoli, 2011) ; v ) the availability of well-established Web development techniques, such as the Asynchronous Javascript And XML (AJAX) method, enable many OSNs to be highly interactive even providing support to realtime features (e.g., to promptly notify a user about changes happening within his/her network of contacts) (Caviglione, 2011) ; vi ) many OSNs can be accessed via ad-hoc client-interfaces specifically crafted for tablets, handheld devices and gaming consoles, making the service ubiquitously available (Hu et al., 2010) ; vii ) as a consequence of a solid mobility support, OSNs also offer localization services, making them suitable for exercising geo-tagged information (Rao & Nagpal, 2011) .
Unfortunately, features i )-vii ) reflect into a variety of security hazards and privacy issues. We mention, among the others:
1. unintentional disclosure of personal information leading to possible attacksà-la social engineering (Caviglione & Coccoli, 2011);  2. due to complex or incoherent privacy and security settings, users can reveal their geographical position. This can lead to breaches into physical security (Ruiz Vicente et al., 2011);  3. the joint utilization of different specialized services can bring to a new type of attacks based upon multiple profile fusion (Krishnamurthy & Wills, 2009) . Nevertheless, the availability of suitable data structures can ease automatic and massive user profiling campaigns (Raad et al., 2010);  4. OSNs are widely accessed from mobile devices, e.g., via IEEE 802.11 air interfaces. Then, additional risks are due the utilization of weak security settings to exchange data (e.g., the usage of HTTP instead of the HyperText Transfer Protocol Secure) (Wu et al., 2007) . Besides, being mobile devices often battery operated, this can bring to a new class of battery-draining attacks  5. third-party Web applications can access to user profiles, turning the OSN into an effective attack platform (see, e.g., Haifeng et al. (2010) for a detailed discussion on many attacks that can be performed via OSNs, such as the Sybil one);
6. to provide highly interactive and sophisticated user-interfaces, also containing mash-ups, specific Web programming paradigms are adopted. This increases the risk of attacks such as request forgeries (Siddiqui & Verma, 2011);  7. the availability of client-interfaces for accessing an OSN from a variety of appliances (e.g., settop boxes and gaming consoles) may foster new threats based upon stack misbehaviors, or protocol fingerprinting. This is even worse for devices not having full-featured TCP/IP stacks that could have exploitable erratic behaviors.
Therefore, the investigation of privacy and security aspects of OSNs is a mandatory action to guarantee their safe and successful utilization. Yet, this is complex, since OSNs have a twofold heterogeneity, i.e., in terms of features and technologies. As a consequence, it is very unlikely to have an ultimate security model or a unified methodology to produce a uniform analysis. Rather, it would be useful to understand the "space" of issues generated by a OSN application, also in the perspective of developing proper countermeasures and evaluating the effectiveness of the state-of-the-art solutions.
In this perspective, the contributions of the paper are: i ) to provide a comprehensive understanding, also through basic modeling, of the hazards introduced by OSN applications; ii ) to investigate privacy issues and possible related exploits; iii ) to showcase a model of a prototypal OSN service, also for highlighting the needed engineering; iv ) to help in the creation of checking procedures to increase the degree of privacy and security of OSN.
At the authors' best knowledge, this is the first attempt in capturing the majority of security and privacy issues related to the adoption of OSN applications also by introducing models and detailed taxonomies for revealing potential cross pollination among different functional viewpoints. However, a partial survey on the topic has been compiled by Hongyu et al. (2011) .
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces a taxonomy-based model to describe the security of an OSN service. Section 3 discusses the security issues of technologies adopted is OSN platforms. Section 4 deals with problems due to specific devices or users' habits, while Section 5 portraits hazards tightly coupled with the "social" nature of such services. Then, Section 6 presents a model of an OSN emphasizing the most critical vulnerabilities. Lastly, Section 7 concludes the work and also proposes future research directions.
Security Space of OSNs: a Taxonomy
In this section we discuss the centrality of security in an OSN-based framework. To this aim, Figure 1 presents a taxonomy-based model of OSN-exploitable hazards. Also it depicts how different spaces can be "reached" through the OSN. The proposed taxonomy is composed by four main functional spaces (namely, device, personal, social and technological ). Being devices and users tightly coupled, they can be further merged to reduce the classification to three layers. Specifically:
• user space: it accounts for weaknesses and exploits consequence of specific devices or users' habits. It is subdivided in two subspaces: i ) the device and ii ) the personal space, respectively. As regards i ), it represents issues related to the set of features offered by a device used to access an OSN service (reference Vildjiounaite et al. (2007) is a detailed survey on issues introduced by mobile devices, as well as possible solutions). Concerning ii ), it groups all the user behaviors leading to breaches into the overall security infrastructure, e.g., social engineering attacks;
• social space: it is strictly affected by the design of the OSN, e.g., datatypes and personal information managed. A possible example concerns private information disclosable via GPS updates. We also mention user-to-user insecuirities, which can lead to bullying or blackmailing (Ochoa et al., 2011) and (Honjo et al., 2011 );
• technological space: it represents the set of security risks related to specific technologies (both hardware and software) used to implement the OSN service. A paradigmatic case could be when accessing an OSN via the Web. Hence, all the flaws known both for the adopted browser and the involved communication protocols (e.g., HTTP(s)) can be exploited (Criscione et al., 2009 ). Another example is the remote attack of web-services used as a public interface by the OSN provider (Jun & Wooyong, 2003) .
Minimal taxonomy-based space modeling
To characterize the role of the OSN in the proposed taxonomy, we introduce a minimal model to describe the security space. Specifically, we want to show how the merge of technological and human factors makes the three-layer taxonomy as a "base" to build a more complex security domain. The latter should be deeply evaluated when engineering or developing social-enabled services. To this aim, let us define U s , S s and T s as the user, social and technological space, respectively. Also, let us define C ss as the OSN Combined Security Space. We model C ss as a combination of the features characterizing each space:
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where, f (·) is an OSN-dependent function for generating the space. As hinted, the OSN enables to mix a huge set of information, services and technologies for malicious operations. Defining a unique model for f (·), possibly analytical, could be impossible and is out of the scope of this work. However, Section 6 will present the modeling of a toy OSN in the perspective of explaining how it can be used systematically to mix the different spaces. To evaluate the number of attacks exploitable for each space (fixed the implementation and the features offered by an OSN service), let us introduce as | · | a kind of cardinality operator. Therefore, an OSN could lead to the following relation:
which states that an OSN can amplify the number of attacks through the exploitation of its physical deployment and stored personal details of a victim. This is a consequence of its intrinsic coupling of devices, (wrong) habits, error-prone engineering choices and technologies.
Before showcasing some paradigmatic examples to prove the validity of Equation (2), let us explain how the functional relationship introduced in Equation (1) can be derived. Let us consider arrows connecting the different spaces depicted in Figure 1 . As it can be noticed, all of them point to the OSN. By exploiting its central role, it could be possible to create "paths" from a layer to another. The type and the number of paths characterize the functional relationship denoted as f (·). Such concept is graphically depicted in Figure 2 .
Let us denote with S an attack that can be performed with the current knowledge of a given space (e.g., the attacker has an exploit), while with T we identify an action that the attacker is not able to do. Thus, the attacker, by using the OSN, can shift to a space to another, i.e., he/she constructs a path from S to T .
To clarify such concept, we introduce the following toy example. Let us assume that an attacker wants to
The security space generated by the different component of an OSN and how it can be exploited.
gain access to the account of an OSN user (i.e., this is the target outcome T ). Forcing a real-deployed OSN could require a non-trivial knowledge, and it could be unfeasible for the average attacker. However (at least from a theoretical point of view), he/she could:
1. check if the victim's profile has some publicly available information through an OSN, for instance the email address;
2. he/she can investigate if the provider has some known weaknesses, or a legacy user/password recovery procedure. For the sake of the example, let us assume that a mechanism based on a "secret question" is used, and the answer can be found within the user profile in the OSN;
3. by performing an identity theft attack, or creating an ad-hoc fake profile, the attacker can become "friend" of the victim. Thus he/she can dig to his/her personal details and find the answer to the secret question. This step can be simple, since many users do allow strangers to access their personal information (Newk-Fon et al., 2008);  4. the attacker can violate the email. Then, since many OSN require an email account for the logins, the registration email could be found in the mailbox. Also, many OSNs send new credentials via email at each password change/restore. Additionally, attacks such as the social phishing (Jugatic et al., 2007) can be directly exploited by using the gathered personal information;
5. the attacker can log into the victim's profile without any technological knowledge.
The proposed example explains how an attacker can "move" from a space to another, resulting into more chances and methods. Also, it underlines that the OSN provider does not have a direct bug or exploitable features. Other possible approaches can rely on developing well-crafted malicious third party applications, or using traffic sniffing tools when in presence of IEEE 802.11 unencrypted accesses to make further actions, such as endpoint profiling through Web search engines, such as Google (Trestian et al., 2008) .
Extension to the multiple profile case
In Section 5.2 we will introduce ad-hoc techniques, such as those based on multiple profiles fusion, to combine C ss belonging to different OSNs. Therefore, we want to extended the model presented in Equation (1) for such a case. Put briefly, a user can participate on different OSN services. Upon identified, it would be possible to move from a space to another, i.e.,
where, C i ss is the OSN Combined Security Space of the i-th service, and N is the number of OSNs where the same user has been identified. The model presented in Equation (3) also gives some idea on how to develop possible countermeasures against space merging. For instance:
• reducing the number of hazards for each OSN by acting on each specific space, as well as in its implementation, i.e., min(
This can be done through optimizing the OSN architecture, for instance in terms of privacy management (thus acting over f (·) i )), or improving the implementation of client-interfaces (therefore reducing |U i s |);
• increasing the degree of decoupling of the spaces within a given OSN as to reduce paths, i.e., reducing the possibility of having a space like the one depicted in Figure 2 . This divide et impera strategy should be at the basis of a good design of any OSN service;
• reducing the chances of identifying the same users in different OSNs, then decoupling the spaces to be adopted, i.e., having Equation (3) not valid anymore since the number of C i ss is reduced, i.e., N ;
• applying simultaneously all the previous approaches.
Issues of the Technological Space
In this section we discuss specific issues affecting the technological space identified in Section 2. For the sake of brevity, we will concentrate on Web technologies and issues related to the network. In fact, despite engineering and design differences, about the totality of OSNs are essentially Web applications. Therefore they potentially suffer from a huge set of vulnerabilities that are intrinsically related to the current model of the Web (James et al., 2001 ). Such vulnerabilities, should be properly corrected with the single-OSN level of granularity, to avoid attacks aimed at compromising the security of the entire service. This can happen at different levels, thus affecting data privacy, confidentiality and application availability, just to cite some. Then, we showcase the most risky vulnerabilities that can impact over a general Web application. To complete the picture, we also introduce some possible hazards due to the specific traffic patterns produced by Web-based OSN services. An important remark is that OWASP vulnerabilities can be easily automated, e.g., via scripts. Therefore, it is very important to properly protect the technological space since it is largely overlapped with the Web. *****In Section 6 we will propose a practical model to systematically exploit such features.
The OWASP top-ten vulnerabilities
We underline that the service provider must adopt suited systems such as, storage security to protect data and information, access management and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) for avoiding external attacks. As regards internal security, proper sandbox-like mechanisms should be used for third party applications and to avoid unauthorized access from the inside.
HTTP traffic issues
The traffic produced by OSN applications exhibit welldefined characteristics, which can be exploited for different malicious actions. Even if anachronistic, one of the major risks is still due to the adoption of HTTP instead of HTTPS for moving data among clients and servers. As a consequence, information gathering can be straightforward. However, traffic sniffing is not always a simple task. For instance, capturing packets from a Digital Subscriber Loop (DSL) is harder than in wireless accesses (e.g., the IEEE 802.11). Nevertheless, the joint adoption of HTTP over non-protected (or weakly protected accesses, such as those employing WEP) channels dramatically eases operations aiming at traffic sniffing. In this perspective, having standard tools, such as Wireshark (Wireshark, 2011) or tcpdump can suffice.
When traffic is not encrypted, attackers can capitalize the flaws that OSNs inherit from the WWW. In fact, OSN applications are mostly accessed through Web browsers, thus having HTML a as core component, i.e., the Web page is the basic building block. This also happens when using other client-interfaces, usually implementing Web-views to speed-up the development cycle and to avoid different server-side implementations. Typically, a Web page is composed by several objects, which have to be retrieved to compose it entirely. Two types of objects exist: the main object (containing the HTML source) and in-line object(s), i.e., those linked within the hypertext. Therefore, it is possible to gather all the objects composing the pages sent by the OSN to a given user. This can be used to reconstruct the network of individuals, the exchanged text, as well as to examine each in-line object (e.g., to see pictures). As a drawback, by inspecting a user traffic is then possible to gain access to "private" material. For instance, a user can have privacy settings preventing strangers to see his/her profile pictures. However, when a friend accesses to his/her profile, data can be captured. This usually guarantees to easily gather enough information to mimic other users profiles or to perform identity theft actions.
Also HTTP encrypted traffic has exploitable features. Actually, SN applications are characterized by welldefined traffic patterns, especially in terms of throughput (see, e.g., Caviglione (2009) for a general investigation of many Web 2.0 services delivered through satellite environments). This is mainly due to the continuous and regular "polling" performed by in-line objects implementing ad-hoc scripts to update in a nearly realtime manner pages, such as, to sync widgets or to deliver Instant Message (IM) notifications. Widespread approaches are AJAX and Comet, where a long-held HTTP connection enables the Web server to push data to the browser, without the need of additional HTTP requests. Therefore, such elements trigger data transfers via HTTP/TCP as well as additional or long-lasting connections******. Such a repetitive behavior can be revealed by calculating the Power Spectral Density (PSD) of the traffic trace. Then, this sort of "fingerprint" can be used to reveal OSN-related activities within encrypted flows, and can be used to perform well-defined attacks, also aided by social engineering approaches. For instance, upon becoming aware a user is online, it could be possible to perform malicious actions such as bullying, or Denial of Service attacks to the target machine (since conversation endpoints are usually not encrypted). Figure 3 suggests the typical network security hierarchy that should be adopted in OSN services, also listing potential "in the middle" intermediaries. Depending on the specific security solutions, proper mechanisms can be implemented at different layers of the ISO/OSI protocol stack. Dotted lines indicate that secure communications can be absent at that level. The typical interaction workflow is:
Network security hierarchy at-large
• the client application can add security directly to the content of the message;
• Web Service gateway can add Web Service Security (WSS) to the system;
• Web Services gateway may allow the WSS header to flow and might add other security;
• Secure Socket Layer (SSL) processor or HTTP Proxy might switch to SSL;
• security is delegated to the network via IP Security (IPSec) (if any).
However, even in presence of a full-featured security hierarchy, other spaces can be used to make malicious actions and to make ineffective network-oriented countermeasures.
Issues of the User Space
In this section we consider issues related to the user space, identifying unwary behaviors of the users that could potentially engender insecurity in all of the other spaces. Specifically we will take into account a set of actions made by end users, which enables to "reach" other spaces as depicted in Figure 2. 
User-to-OSN interaction
To better understand issues related to the user space, we describe interactions among OSN sites and typical service consumers, e.g., from Web browser to third party applications. The main interactions can be grouped as follows:
1. Users directly interact with OSNs through the Web browser, as well as from the official client-interfaces if available. In both cases, users can access from different devices and/or network locations. To cope with such usage paradigm personalized settings are usually adopted, to prevent from re-authenticating (e.g., by typing username and password) each time.
Such an insecure behavior is also supported by the OSN infrastructure that does not take any corrective actions when multiple sessions are open concurrently.
2. Users access the OSN from "mediating" entities, which mix data to build enriched contents via mash-up. To enable such features, read/write permissions should be granted by the users to the third party applications. This allows machineto-machine communications by means of ad-hoc APIs. With an application-level of granularity, the access privileges can be requested at different levels (i.e., to inspect personal information, or to modify the user's profile). As a result, applications transparently act on behalf the user. This can lead to scam applications, which can leak data or result into very powerful hacking tools, especially when combined with social phishing, or suggested by (posing) trusted contacts.
3. Users or applications use the OSN as a "data provider". This service is not offered by all the OSNs, but is becoming very diffuse. In this case, the OSN makes public portions of its knowledge via specific APIs as a snapshot of the social attitudes and relationships of an user. Popular mechanisms are, for instance, Social Graph for Google and Opengraph for Facebook. As it will be discussed in Section 5.2, we guess how this feature can be employed to draw information about multiple nodes, to reveal connections and attacks aimed at endangering users' privacy.
From a more technical point of view, Figure 4 shows how the aforementioned interactions happen through a reference architecture. Also it depicts relevant information flows of the "authorization chain" typically deployed in an OSN.
Device space issues
The availability of powerful and cost effective appliances, jointly with the cultural explosion of OSN applications, Figure 4 Reference architecture of and relevant information flows of the "authorization chain" typically deployed in an OSN.
modify the attitude of many users when utilizing the Internet. Besides, the ever-growing adoption of mobile devices, reflects in many people accessing OSN services from their personal devices while "on the road". This can impact on many aspects related to their security and privacy.
Firstly, devices such as smart phones and tablets, enable the continuous interaction also hiding and automating authentication mechanism and data exchanges. In particular, due to their "very personal" nature, this machineries lower the level of carefulness of their users, while increasing attention from many attackers (Leavitt, 2011) .
In addition, devices able to access OSNs, may also have limited capabilities (both in terms of CPU and power resources) as well as incomplete or flawed protocol implementations. Therefore, by recognizing an endpoint producing traffic for OSN activities (e.g., by using the signature approach discussed in Section 3.2), it can be attacked. If the target host is a mobile device or a gaming console, traffic flooding attacks (such as ping flooding) can lead to a quick battery-drain, crash or intermittent connectivity .
Moreover, stack vulnerabilities are often welldocumented, thus it could be possible to send wellformatted packets to crash the victim's appliance. This is even true for many TVs or set-top boxes offering access to the Internet without the worrying to implement a proper degree of sophistication of the protocol stack (Brentham, 2002) .
Personal space issues
As discussed, devices usually store access credentials to OSN permanently. Thus, the first security weakness is a physical one, related with the risk of leaving the machinery unattended.
The adoption of HTTPS has been already discussed in Section 3.2. However, users can decide to by-pass its adoption, when this is a requirement imposed by third party applications. Hence, it is possible to develop applications asking for HTTP connectivity, then allowing to perform attacks based on traffic inspection.
An additional security breach can be caused by the trustful use of harmful applications that somebody (many times a "friend") has recommended (Stajano & Wilson, 2011) . Many malware software spread this way. Especially: i ) according to a "chain-letter" mechanism, people sends suggestions to their contacts, with detailed information on some software to install (e.g., by providing URLs); ii ) by using fake profiles, crafted via identity theft techniques (as it will discussed in detail in Section 5).
Social space issues
Since OSNs are made for sharing a wide variety of personal information, this can lead to the empowerment of common social engineering tricks and to their successful application with the aim of performing malicious actions. Also, the concept of privacy protection somehow clashes with the main objective of an OSN, which is sharing (personal) information with the aim of creating communities and relationships, as well as maintaining and reinforcing personal contacts. Despite the presence of many possible "security-settings", users should understand that they are the only responsible of their information.
Therefore, in this section we will discuss issues related to privacy rather than security (Rosenblum, 2007) .
Data gathering for social engineering
One of the most relevant aspects of the privacy management in OSNs considers the refinement of social engineering techniques, which can overtake any software/hardware countermeasure. This approach is further empowered by the encouragement in sharing personal information made by OSNs. The more detailed the information is, the more efficient the social platform should behave. In addition, when publishing plain text, videos or pictures (e.g., when updating a status on Facebook or posting a message on Twitter) one is also requested to add the geographical position to route interesting updates to potential neighbors.
Social engineers can greatly benefit from such a huge amount of information and data publicly available within OSNs. For instance (Huber et al., 2009) propose the use of a bot to automate the operations of information gathering, which are a prerequisite for social engineering attacks. Interestingly, the used software agent was not detected or blocked by the OSN site "attacked" during the experiments. This is due to the fact that the relevant security measures are primarily concerned with unsolicited bulk messages and not against software entities behaving like normal users. Generally speaking, given the high percentage of users connected participating in OSN activities, it is easy to gather information about persons, even in an automated manner, with batch procedures, through Web spiders (Gupta & Johari, 2009 ) and agents (Bodorik & Jutla, 2008) .
Multiple profile fusion
As said, the scenario of OSNs is highly specialized, thus the average users has, usually, more than one account to join different services. As an example, let us consider a user having the same username in two different OSNs.
Then, a possible attack is based on profile fusion, which aims at matching common user's information from different OSNs. In a recent research (Irani et al., 2011) , this problem has been outlined as the "unintended personal-information leakage". For a better understanding and quantification, a specific indicator has been defined, called the social footprint. Put briefly, it measures the personal information that a specific user makes available online. In this way, by using data from different OSNs a kind of super-identity can be built. The latter originates from the matching and merging of different user profiles (even with different usernames) based on common information, localization, friends and relationships. As a consequence, traditional attacks, such as physical identification and password recovery, could become trivial.
Using different identifiers (IDs) for each OSN is a commonly adopted strategy to maintain anonymity. However, it may be not sufficient (e.g., if explicit links are present through the different OSNs). The actual trend is using shared accounts over the Web, as to guarantee a seamless access to different applications, services and OSNs. Hence, profiles created for a given site are commonly used as credentials for some other services (e.g., the ubiquitous "Sign-In with Facebook" button or the "Google Account", which is used by multiple services such as YouTube, as well as the "Yahoo! Account", used by Flickr). To allow such cross-site operations, the OAuth protocol is used to manage identities across services (Leiba, 2012) , which can become ineffective within public or shared wireless connections.
A unified identity is the first steps towards the model of the social Web envisaged by the W3C, as hinted in Section 1. To this aim, different projects exist, such as ping.fm, UniqueID or Gravatar, which automatically recognize a user's identity when, e.g., by using cookies. A more ambitious project is the FOAF+SSL WebID protocol (WebID Incubator Group, 2012) , which is the secure authentication protocol defined by the W3C WebID Incubator Group, to enable the building of distributed, open, and secure social networks, according to the model of the Social Web.
However, unifying users' identities could make profile fusion easier. In this case, also anonymizing data could be not sufficient, especially due to the availability of machine-to-machine data structures, (as discussed in Section 4.1) makes the "deanonymization" of OSN data very simple (Narayanan & Shmatikov (2009) show a comprehensive experiment on data denonymization).
Identity theft
Techniques discussed so far give to attacker the tools for i ) gathering information about real persons and ii ) building own profiles and perform identity theft. This allows to take advantages of the trust given by the OSN neighbors, to launch malicious actions. Identity theft successfulness is based on the trust relationship, which makes malicious actions considered as reliable. This kind of attack is also performed through cloning attacks (Bilge et al., 2009) , i.e., the aim is to access the contacts of a chosen victim, based on the premise that "users are generally not cautious when accepting friend requests". We underline that the same techniques used to perform attacks can be exploited to counteract malicious behaviors, as in Stringhini et al. (2010) , where accounts used by spammers were automatically identified and violations were reported to the OSN administrator (i.e, Twitter and Facebook in their work) who deleted thousands of spamming profiles. Lastly, an example of code needed to build applications devoted to find security holes in machines exploiting identity theft is available in Patsakis et al. (2009) .
Impact of Social Network Flaws
In this section we analyze how a malicious user can exploit vulnerabilities related to technological, user and social spaces by simply belonging to the OSN and legally operating on the OSN model. To this aim, we introduce a simple model, describing the logical organization of an OSN.
A graph model for OSNs
From a general perspective, each OSN can be seen as a set of associations between users (mapping physical users) and social objects, such as messages, posts, photos, movies and so on. The social background of an OSN is given by the set of all associations of i ) users-tousers (i.e., friendship), ii ) users-to-objects (i.e., tagging), and iii ) objects-to-objects (i.e., posting). Any object is expected to be related to at least one user (the owner) as well as each user is expected to be related to at least one object (i.e., the personal profile).
In this scenario, users can relate themselves to objects and perform operations involving other members of the social network, such as associating other users to objects, under given constraints (e.g., friendships). Users can also remove such associations. We underline that, to enable the possible interactions and mutual permissions, privacy and security policies may be different from OSN to OSN but investigating such differences is out of the scope of the paper.
What we present is an informal model, which has been designed as an abstraction of the functionalities offered both by Facebook and Google+. At the same time it should be regarded as reference point in the OSN landscape. The model allows representing the associations arranged in a graph. Associations and, accordingly, the graph, can be modified upon the execution of valid operations performed by users. For each OSN a specific set of operations is defined, then the user is allowed to execute them under proper constraints. The successful achievement of a given action reflects in a modification of the status of the graph.
Given U as the set of users of the OSN, and O the set of the objects, we define four basic relations:
• Friendship (u 1 , u 2 ). It defines a friendship relation between two users.
• Owner(u, o). It states that user u is the owner (i.e., the builder) of object o.
• Assignment(u, o). It states that user u is related to object o, as a result of a linking operation performed by himself or other users (i.e., friends).
• Connection(o 1 , o 2 ). It states that two objects are related due to operations made by their respective owners.
Obviously, each object may be built and destroyed by a user as well as each user can delete a previously established friendship relation. Typical operations in an OSN can be defined on top of the previous relations. With reference to their common meaning and using a Prolog-like syntax, we define the following operations:
Friendship(u 1 , u 2 ). The sending of private chat message, allowed exclusively between friends.
• Message(u 1 , o, UList) :-Owner(u 1 , o). Sending of a public message to friend and non friend users.
• Update(u, o):-Owner(u,o). Updating the status of an object (e.g., profile).
•
. Posting an object o 1 (e.g., a photo) on another object o 2 (e.g., the wall of another user).
• Tagging(u 1 o, u 2 ) :-Owner(u 1 , o), Friendship(u 1 , u 2 ). Tagging a user u 2 on an object o belonging to user u 1 .
Such relations may be represented on a graph as depicted in Figure 5 . Each operation modifies the state of the graph into a new state. Figure 6 shows a sample graph representing i ) a chat message from u 1 to u 2 , ii ) a tagging of user u 2 on o 1 performed by u 1 , iii ) a posting of o 2 on o 3 , and iv ) a message involving users u 2 , u 3 and u 4 . The presented model and the related operations limit the impact of each user on the graph. In particular:
• users may only modify the graphs by invoking operations, which are subject to constraints (i.e., the right hand side of each operation). For instance, by default a user u 1 cannot force a user u 2 to add u 3 as a friend;
• users have a limited impact on the graph, accessing objects they own or they are associated with, accordingly to the operational constraints;
• users have a limited view of the graph.
We show here how a malicious user can combine and exploit threats and vulnerabilities in the technological, user and social spaces to overcome such limitations without violating the model.
Technological, user and social spaces threats
From a general point of view, the previous model allows the building of graph as a result of operations exclusively performed by the set of users. Thus, the user is de facto the main vulnerability point in an OSN. Therefore, forcing the user to perform unwanted actions is the most straightforward way for a malicious user to build unwanted friendship relations, associations and connections. This leads to OSN graphs, which are still valid but do not reflect real social connections between users, thus allowing malicious ones to violate both privacy and security.
In our model, objects are connection points between users. Thus, objects correspond to vulnerability points that can be exploited to force legal users to modify their social connections, by inadvertently execute operations.
Objects may be target of threats belonging to all three spaces we analyzed in the previous sections.
Technological space
Currently, OSNs implement objects as HTML elements, since OSNs are Web applications. Thus, all objects may potentially convey some OWASP vulnerabilities like XSS, or SQL injection if proper checks at implementation level are not performed. For instance, with reference to the graph in Figure 6 , let us suppose that malicious user u 2 aims at stealing u 1 session cookie by sending a chat message to u 1 . User u 2 may embed a JavaScript (JS) code, forwarding the cookie of u 1 to an external server, performing a XSS attack. In fact, the browser of u 1 automatically executes the JS code as soon as the user accesses to the message. Besides, u 2 is granted to receive the right cookie (i.e., the one granting the access to the OSN) since only authenticated users can access to messages. The success of the previous attack may lead u 2 to be recognized as u 1 and perform legal operations on the graph in his stead, like updating u 1 profile, as shown in Figure 7 .
In general, vulnerabilities and threats of technological space are mandatory in order to exploit weakness typical of user and social space. 
User space
User space vulnerabilities are mostly due to the OSN support to multiple connections enabling the same user to be contemporary connected to OSN through a desktop PC, a mobile device and a game console, just to cite some. Such an approach inevitably opens the OSN to threats that are typical of mobile devices, which generally keeps the user indefinitely logged. With reference to to the OWASP vulnerabilities, this scenario is a more fertile ground for XSRF attacks than other Web applications. For instance, let us consider a mobile device used by user u 4 to connect to the OSN. Let us also suppose that malicious user u 2 gets to know the cell number of u 4 by analyzing his public profile and aims to force u 4 to inadvertently add him as a friend. Since the command request for adding a friend is publicly available to OSN application developers, u 2 may send an MMS, an SMS or an email, which embeds a link containing an "add friend" command to u 4 . If u 4 goes through the link, the operation is executed without any interaction with the user, due to the fact that the session is open and OSN applications do not require re-authentication. As a result, a valid "add friend" operation is executed by u 4 , as depicted in Figure 8 .
Note that in this case, there is no identity theft as in the previous case. The actual user u 4 performs the "add friend" operation.
Social space
Broken Authentication attacks are aimed at retrieving credentials of a legal user in order to impersonate him. Also in this case, OSNs simplify the successful execution of such attack, due to the high number of information available that can be retrieved by malicious users, simply executing suitable operations on the OSN graph. One of the typical ways to retrieve a user's credential is to use a password retrieval service (offered by each OSN), where a user is challenged on secret information (e.g., the mother's maid name) that, once retrieved, allows the user to change his credentials. A malicious user may try to discover users on the network and to access password retrieval as those users. This can be obtained, for instance, by posting appealing objects on friends' wall. Such objects may act as a sort of honeypot, taking friends to tag other users as depicted in Figure 9 , where u 3 is the malicious user and u 2 tags his friend u 1 . Once a malicious user gets information on other users, he may try to access password retrieval service in her stead (such service is offered, by definition, to unauthenticated users), discovering the secret question. Thus, he can try to find out whether such information are publicly available on user profile.
In all the three kind of attacks, graph is transformed through valid operations, making very hard the discovery of malicious behaviors by the OSN. In fact, OSN may check for anomalous patterns (e.g., a high number of posting/tagging from the same user in a short period of time) but it is powerless against low-profile and sparse attacks. Besides, due to the high number of operations that are averagely executed on an OSN, it is hard for a generic user to be aware of forced and unwanted operations like those explained in this section.
Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we investigated several security issues affecting SN applications. Specifically, we addressed hazards spawned by the adoption of Web technologies, possible exploits observable from traffic patterns, as well as security issues. Future works aim at enlarging this study, also by taking into account commercial available services.
